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RACIAL PREFERENCES, QUOTAS, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Lino A. Graglia*
INTRODUCTION
Jean-Francois Revel begins his recent book with the sentence,
"The foremost of all the forces that drive the world is falsehood." 1
This is nowhere more true than in regard to the subject of civil
rights and racial discrimination in the United States today. Mea-
sures that will have the intended effect of requiring race discrimina-
tion are put forth in the name of civil rights; requirements of dis-
crimination are justified as measures to end discrimination.
In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education2 and Bolling v. Sharpe,3
a companion case, the United States Supreme Court established the
principle that all racial discrimination by government, state or fed-
eral, is prohibited by the Constitution. At least this is what everyone
believed the Court established, as it quickly extended the nondis-
crimination principle to all publicly owned facilities without further
explanation.' Once established, the principle was immediately seen
as so appealing, so obviously just and necessary in the American
context, as to be irresistible. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("1964
Act"), the most important civil rights legislation in our- history,
Congress ratified, endorsed, and extended the nondiscrimination
principle. Title IV of the Act, providing for enforcement of Brown
by the Attorney General, 6 and Title VI, prohibiting racial discrimi-
* A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law, The University of Texas at Austin. My thanks to Kay
Graglia for her helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. JEAN-FRANCOIS REVEL. THE FLIGHT FROM TRUTH: THE REIGN OF DECEIT IN THE AGE OF
INFORMATION 3 (1992).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
4. E.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam) (buses), petition for clarification and
reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 950 (1956); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per
curiam) (public beaches and bath houses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam)
(municipal golf courses).
5. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
6. Title IV states:
Whenever the Attorney General receives a complaint in writing . and the Attor-
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nation by institutions receiving federal funds,7 made Brown effective
and enforceable for the first time, quickly bringing state-imposed
school segregation to an end. Going much further than Brown, the
Act prohibited even private discrimination in public accommoda-
tions (Title II)8 and employment (Title VII). 9 The history of the law
of racial discrimination in the United States since the passage of the
Act, however, is a history of the turning of the 1964 Act against
itself. The ending of official and public discrimination against
blacks, the triumph of Brown, had come to seem to the victors too
limited an achievement. The time had come, they decided, to seek a
still greater victory, a return to racial discrimination, this time
against whites.
In what surely is one of the most extraordinary stories in the his-
tory of law, Brown's and the 1964 Act's prohibitions of discrimina-
tion were converted into permissions for or even requirements of dis-
crimination. The Civil Rights Act of 199110 is another step in this
direction. Because racial discrimination could not and still cannot be
defended before the American people, however, it has had to be im-
posed by administrative agencies and courts, and now by Congress,
by stealth, not by openly rejecting Brown's and the 1964 Act's
prohibitions of discrimination, but in the name of enforcing those
prohibitions. Falsehood has been and continues to be the indispensa-
ble driving force. Its use has been unusually effective in this area
because the goals of increased racial integration and black advance-
ment are obviously so highly moral as to reduce to a quibble any
objection to the use of immoral means.
ney General believes the complaint is meritorious and certifies that the signer or sign-
ers of such complaint are unable, in his judgment, to initiate and maintain appropri-
ate legal proceedings for relief and that the institution of an action will materially
further the orderly achievement of desegregation in public education, the Attorney
General is authorized . . . to institute . . . a civil action in any appropriate district
court of the United States against such parties and for such relief as may be appropri-
ate . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000b(a) (1988).
7. Title VI states:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. I11 1991).
10. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
1118 [Vol. 41:1117
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1. THE BEGINNING OF THE COUNTERREVOLUTION:
FROM PROHIBITING TO REQUIRING RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION
If Brown began the revolution in the law of racial discrimination,
Green v. County School Board,"1 decided in 1968, began the coun-
terrevolution. In Green, the NAACP stipulated that the New Kent
County, Virginia, school system was being operated free of racial
discrimination, but challenged its constitutionality, nonetheless, on
the ground that one of its two schools remained all black. The lower
courts held that since the school system admittedly was free of ra-
cial discrimination, it was obviously in compliance with Brown. 2
The only two options for the Supreme Court, it seemed, were either
to affirm this conclusion or to hold that compliance with Brown was
no longer the constitutional requirement and that the new require-
ment was, not the elimination, but the practice of racial discrimina-
tion, now not to prevent but in order to increase school racial inte-
gration. The Court did not want to take the first
option-compliance with Brown, a dream a short time before, had
suddenly become for the truly committed to "civil rights" much too
limited a goal. But the Court could hardly take the second option
and openly announce that the Constitution did not prohibit all racial
discrimination by government after all, as everyone thought was
held by Brown, and that the Constitution actually sometimes re-
quired racial discrimination.
In the practiced hands of Justice Brennan, the Court found a
third, albeit totally dishonest, option. The requirement remained,
Justice Brennan insisted, the requirement of Brown-the total elimi-
nation of racial discrimination. But the New Kent County school
11. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
12. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, af-
firmed the district court's holding that the school board was operating in compliance with Brown.
382 F.2d 338, 339 (1967). The Fourth Circuit's decision in Green was governed by Bowman v.
County School Board, 382 F.2d 326 (1967), which the Fourth Circuit had decided that same day.
In Bowman a group of black pupils attacked the same "freedom of choice" school selection plan
that was attacked in Green. Under this plan each pupil was given the unrestricted right to attend
any public school in the system. Thus, a black child could voluntarily choose to leave an all-black
public school in favor of an all-white or predominantly white public school. The court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the school board had a constitutional obligation to compel racial integra-
tion or "balance" in the public schools. The court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
require that an individual black pupil be deprived of his choice to attend any school, unless his
choice was not free: "Since the plaintiffs here concede that their annual choice is unrestricted and
unencumbered, we find in its existence no denial of any constitutional right not to be subjected to
racial discrimination." Id. at 328.
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system was not in compliance with Brown, despite the elimination of
racial discrimination, because its schools were not racially bal-
anced.'" The Court thus performed the amazing feat of changing
Brown's and the 1964 Act's prohibition of segregation and all offi-
cial racial discrimination into a requirement of integration and offi-
cial racial discrimination and did it with no explanation other than
that it was only continuing to enforce the prohibition-a feat possi-
ble only by a decision maker subject to no review. To this day, the
Court continues to insist that there is no requirement of integration
as such and that the only requirement is "desegregation"- that al-
though it is requiring the assignment of students to school by race,
it is actually enforcing Brown's prohibition of racial assignment. 4
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,5 de-
cided in 1971, the Court brought Green to full fruition holding that
"desegregation" meant that students were to be excluded from their
neighborhood schools because of their race-precisely what Brown
had prohibited-and transported to more distant schools when nec-
essary to produce greater school racial mixing. This was still only a
requirement of "desegregation," however, not of integration for its
own sake, the Court asserted, because it applied only to schools that
had been segregated in violation of Brown-not to all school racial
separation-and its only purpose was to "remedy" the continuing
effects of that unconstitutional segregation. 6
Thus was born the "remedy" rationale for requiring or permitting
racial discrimination, not only in the face of prohibitions of such
discrimination, but on the basis of a claim to be enforcing those
prohibitions. Racial discrimination used only to cancel or negate
earlier racial discrimination, the theory apparently is, may actually
result in a net reduction of racial discrimination. There are, how-
ever, two vitiating difficulties with this rationale in the school con-
text. First, the claim to be merely counteracting or undoing the ef-
fects of past segregation is patently untrue: In practice, the
13. Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42.
14. E.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
15. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
16. Id. at 15. The district court had imposed, as a "norm," a racial balance requirement of
71% white/29% black on individual public schools. The Supreme Court stated that, if the district
court had imposed such a requirement as a "matter of constitutional right," the Supreme Court
would have been "obliged to reverse" the district court's decision. The Supreme Court, however,
purported to read the 71 %-29% requirement as merely a "starting point" in fashioning a "rem-
edy" for segregation prohibited by Brown. Id. at 23-26.
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requirement was not limited to undoing the effects of past unconsti-
tutional segregation. In Swann, for example, the Court ordered a
near-perfect racial balance in the schools of Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina, although such racial balance did not and does not
exist even in school systems that had never practiced racial segrega-
tion.17 Second, the theory does not, in any event, make sense: The
merits of compulsory integration, if any, would not seem to depend
on the cause of the racial separation being "remedied"; if compul-
sory integration is sound social policy in formerly segregated school
districts, it should be sound social policy everywhere. The only func-
tion of the "desegregation-remedy" rationale for compulsory inte-
gration is to conceal the fact that compulsory integration cannot be
justified.
Whatever doubt there might be about the true meaning of Brown
or the Constitution regarding compulsory school racial integration,
there can be no doubt about the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Title IV of the Act states as clearly as language permits that
"'[d]esegregation' means the assignment of students to public
schools . . . without regard to their race" and, redundantly, that
"'desegregation' shall not mean the assignment of students to public
schools in order to overcome racial imbalance."18 Unfortunately,
Congress neglected to specify that its explicit and repeated preclu-
sion of racial assignment to overcome racial imbalance was meant to
apply in the South as well as the North, that is, even when practiced
only to "remedy" unconstitutional segregation. Chief Justice Bur-
ger's opinion for a unanimous Court in Swann disposed of these
statutory provisions as follows:
The legislative history of Title IV indicates that Congress was concerned
that the Act might be read as creating a right of action under the Four-
teenth Amendment in the situation of so-called "de facto segregation,"
where racial imbalance exists in the schools but with no showing that this
was brought about by discriminatory action by state authorities.' 9
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Burger neglected, however, to cite
the legislative history he was referring to, which can be explained by
17. Id. at 22-31. As Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion in Keyes v. School
District No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 222 (1971): "In imposing on metropolitan southern school districts
an affirmative duty, entailing large-scale transportation of pupils, to eliminate segregation in the
schools, the Court required these districts to alleviate conditions which in large part did not result
from historic, state-imposed de jure segregation."
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1988).
19. Swan, 402 U.S. at 17-18.
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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1117
the fact that no such legislative history exists.2" This remarkable
performance established that there were no effective limits on the
ability of the Court to defy the 1964 Act's prohibitions of discrimi-
nation where the effect would be to increase integration; it set the
precedent for the Court's undoing of the Act's other titles.
II. FROM PROHIBITING TO REQUIRING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT
What Green and Swann did to Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.21 and United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber 22 did to Title VII. It was also what the Court did
to Title VI in Regents. of the University of California v. Bakke,2"
holding that Title VI's prohibition of racial discrimination against
any "person" by institutions receiving federal funds was perfectly
consistent with discrimination against whites.24 The Court in
Griggs, by disallowing the use of ordinary employment criteria that
disproportionately disqualified blacks, converted Title VII's require-
ment that employment decisions be race-neutral into a requirement
that no employment decision be made without taking race into ac-
count.5 As with the schools, the need became to avoid not racial
discrimination but racial imbalance, that is, to practice racial dis-
crimination. Weber took Griggs to its logical conclusion by making
explicit the Court's view, implicit in Griggs, that Title Vii's prohibi-
tion of racial discrimination in employment does not preclude the
use of quotas and discrimination against whites.26
20. For a full discussion, see LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DEGREE: THE SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976).
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
23. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24. Id. at 287. Title VI states, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
25. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-33. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against
any individual with respect to his employment because of that individual's race. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). Title VII further specifically prohibits an employer from limiting, segre-
gating, or classifying an employee or applicant on the basis of race in a way that would tend to
deprive him of employment opportunities. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
26. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201-08. In Weber, an employer adopted an "affirmative action" pro-
gram that reserved for black employees 50% of the available openings in a job-training program
until the percentage of black employees became commensurate with the percentage of blacks in
the relevant labor market. The plaintiff, a white employee, was denied admission to the program
because blacks with less seniority were given preference. Id. at 197-200.
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In Griggs, the defendant employer made high school graduation
and a passing score on certain standardized general intelligence or
aptitude tests conditions of eligibility for employment in positions
that involved more skills than simple manual labor. The Court held
that the use of these criteria constituted racial discrimination pro-
hibited by Title VII because they had the effect of making a larger
proportion of blacks than of whites ineligible for the positions to
which the criteria applied.27 As in Swann, Chief Justice Burger
wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court, and as in Swann, Burger
supported his supposed interpretation of the 1964 Act with asser-
tions as to Congress's true intent, which he supposedly found in the
Act's legislative history. This history, however, he again unfortu-
nately neglected to cite-for the reason that it does not exist.28
The problem posed by Title VII, and other titles of the 1964 Act,
for those who seek to make a civil rights "advance" from individual
to group rights is not that the Act is unclear but that it all too
clearly prohibits the racial discrimination they seek to impose. To
the Court of the late 1960s and the 1970s, swollen with pride at the
success of Brown, basking in its recognition as the "conscience of
the nation," and determined to remain at the forefront of the cause
of racial progress, the 1964 Act quickly went from being the na-
tion's greatest civil rights achievement to an impediment to further
progress. In the Court's view, the Act, committed to the protection
of individual rights, was not to be administered but overcome.
The question, the Court said in Griggs, is whether Title VII pro-
hibits an employer from making minimum requirements of educa-
tion and intelligence conditions for employment without offering jus-
tification when those requirements disqualify a greater proportion of
blacks than of whites.29 But how could that be the question? How
can a preference for educated and intelligent employees over em-
ployees who are less so violate a prohibition of racial discrimina-
tion? To say that it can is simply a devious way of saying that an
employer must permit racial considerations to prevail over ordinary
and legitimate business considerations. It is to conceal an indefen-
sible requirement of racial discrimination-a requirement that less-
qualified employees be preferred to better-qualified employees for
racial reasons-behind the facade of a prohibition of racial
27. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
28. Id. at 436.
29. Id. at 425-26.
1992] 1123
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discrimination.
The Court's opinion in Griggs consists largely of a series of asser-
tions about congressional intent that are not only without basis in,
but directly contradicted by, the 1964 Act's plain terms and legisla-
tive history. "The Act," the Court said, "proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrimi-
natory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to, be related to job performance, the practice is prohib-
ited."30 "Congress," the Court reiterated, "has placed on the em-
ployer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have
a manifest relationship to the employment in question,"'" and so on.
The Court offered no citation for these remarkable assertions, all
the more remarkable because the issue of the employer's freedom to
set employment qualifications, including even unnecessarily high
qualifications, was extensively debated in Congress and clearly de-
cided contrary to the Court's conclusion.3 2
The specific issue of the use of intelligence tests arose when a
.hearing examiner in Motorola, a state employment discrimination
case, ruled that an employer could not use an intelligence test that a
disproportionate number of blacks failed to pass. 33 That such a re-
sult might follow from Title VII was the strongest argument its op-
ponents could make against it. Indeed, if that argument were ac-
30. Id. at 431.
31. Id. at 432.
32. "The Court cited not a line in a committee report, not a colloquy on the floor of either
house of Congress, not the testimony of a witness before a committee, not even the report of a
journalist in a newspaper. The reason is that no such evidence exists." Michael E. Gold, Griggs'
Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Em-
ployment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUs. REL. L.J. 429, 480-81
(1985). This article is the definitive refutation of Griggs' purported reading of the 1964 Act's
legislative history.
33. The decision and order of the hearing officer are reprinted at 110 CONG. REC. 9030-33
(1964). In Motorola, Leon Myart, a black, claimed that Motorola had failed to hire him because
of his race. Myart based his claim on the Illinois Fair Employment Practice law. Myart had
studied electronics at a vocational high school and had received his high school diploma from an
adult school where he had completed a course for electrical technicians. He also had some practi-
cal experience repairing television sets. Myart applied for the position of analyzer and phaser,
which required troubleshooting radio, television, and stereophonic sets as they came off the assem-
bly line. As part of the employee-selection process, Motorola gave Myart the company's "Test No.
10," a twenty-eight-question written examination that Motorola routinely gave to all applicants.
The examination was basically an intelligence test. Myart failed the examination. The hearing
examiner for the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission concluded that the examination
was illegal because black applicants, due to their culturally deprived and disadvantaged back-
ground, achieved lower scores than white applicants. See id. at 9032.
1124 [Vol. 41:1117
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cepted, it would have been sufficient to defeat the 1964 Act, and the
Act's proponents did all they could to make clear that Title VII did
not mean what the Court nonetheless found it to mean in Griggs.
Provisions were added to the Act explicitly stating that only "inten-
tional" discrimination was prohibited3 ' and that ability tests not
used to discriminate racially were not prohibited. 5
An authoritative Interpretive Memorandum prepared by the bi-
partisan co-managers of Title VII in the Senate stated:
There is no requirement in title VII that employers abandon bona fide
qualification tests where, because of differences in background and educa-
tion, members of some groups are able to perform better on these tests than
members of other groups. An employer may set his qualifications as high as
he likes, he may test to determine which applicants have these qualifications,
and he may hire, assign, and promote on the basis of test performance.3
Senator Case, one of the comanagers, assured the Senate that "no
court could read title VII as requiring an employer to lower or
change the occupational qualifications he sets for his employees sim-
ply because proportionately fewer Negroes than whites are able to
meet them." 37
The Court in Griggs held, nonetheless, that Congress meant to
prohibit employers from using ordinary employment criteria that
disproportionately disqualified blacks unless the employers were
willing to assume a burden of justification.38 A statute that could
not have been passed but for assurances that it merely prohibited
racial and certain other discrimination was thus effectively con-
verted into a statute requiring racial discrimination, such as the re-
jection of whites meeting ordinary employment qualifications in or-
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (a court may take corrective action where it finds that
"respondent has intentionally engaged or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice"), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071,
1075. Senator Humphrey, the principal proponent and Senate Floor Manager of the bill that
became the Act, stated that "Section [2000e-5(g)] is amended to require a showing of intentional
violation of the title in order to obtain relief." 110 CONG. REC. 12,723 (1964). This was only a
"clarifying change," he pointed out, since the title's prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
race "would seem already to require intent." Id.; see also Charles J. Cooper, Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio: A Step Toward Eliminating Quotas in the American Workplace, 14 HARV. J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y 84 (1991) (Title VII, as enacted, prohibited only intentional discrimination).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(h) (1988); see also Gold, supra note 32, at 533-49. The 1991 Act
added a new provision to Title VII that prohibits the "race norming" of test scores. Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 106, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(l) (1988 & Supp. Ii 1991)).
36. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
37. Id. at 7246-47 (punctuation omitted).
38. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
1992] 1125
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
der to hire blacks who do not. The opponents of racial preferences
and quotas, even when employed against whites, prevailed in Con-
gress only to have their victory taken away by the Supreme Court.
II1. How MUCH MUST EMPLOYERS DISCRIMINATE?-THE
MEANING OF "BUSINESS NECESSITY" PRIOR TO
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
The result of Griggs was to change the central question in em-
ployment discrimination law from whether an employer had dis-
criminated on the basis of race to what showing he would be re-
quired to make before being allowed to use employment criteria that
blacks disproportionately cannot meet. Employers clearly had to
lower employment standards in order to increase employment oppor-
tunities for blacks, but by how much? In Griggs, the Court stated
the requirement of justification in varying language, as if heedless of
the need for a definitive formulation. It stated at one point, for ex-
ample, that "[t]he touchstone is business necessity," 9 at another
that a challenged requirement must be "shown to be related to job
performance,"40 and at still another that it must have "a manifest
relationship to the employment in question."41 It was not enough,
the Court said, that an employer believed-reasonably enough one
would think-that minimum education and standardized test score
requirements "generally would improve the overall quality of the
work force." 42 Such requirements could not be used unless the em-
ployer could show that he had made a "meaningful study of their
relationship to job-performance ability.1 43
How will an employer be able to show, however, that an applicant
who completed high school would likely make a better employee
than one who completed only three years or two years or did not
attend at all, or that an applicant with an IQ test score of 95 or 100
would be better than one with a score of 85 or 80? Unfortunately,
"meaningful" studies making such showings are not often available
or can be obtained only at substantial cost.44 The one certainty is
that the employer's Title VII problems are almost always about
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 432.
42. Id. at 431.
43. Id.
44. See Gold, supra note 32, at 454-57 (noting that there exist no satisfactory guidelines to
assist an employer in proving that its employment criteria are job-related).
1126 [Vol. 41:1117
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whether his work force has the proper "balance" in terms of race or
sex; that is, in the typical race case, whether he has hired enough
blacks." The Court's insistence in Griggs that "[d]iscriminatory
preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only
what Congress has proscribed"" was, therefore, inconsistent with
what the Court required of employers in fact. The actual require-
ment is the hiring of employees who are less educated or intelligent
or otherwise less competent or trustworthy than others who are
available, in order to provide additional employment for blacks.
Later Supreme Court cases applying what became known as the
Griggs "disparate impact" theory of racial discrimination stated the
employer's burden of justification for challenged job requirements in
varying ways. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,47 the Court, quot-
ing EEOC guidelines, stated that "discriminatory tests are imper-
missible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be
'predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of
work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for
which candidates are being evaluated.'"" In Dothard v. Rawlin-
son,49 an alleged sex discrimination case, the Court held that the
defendant had failed to show that its height and weight require-
ments for the position of prison guard were correlated with "the req-
45. However, even an employer having a work force comprised of "enough blacks" may not
satisfy Title VII. In Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), a majority of the Supreme Court,
led by Justice Brennan, rejected the so-called "bottom line" defense. There, the employer, a Con-
necticut state agency, had promoted to supervisory positions 22.9% of the black candidates, and
only 13.5% of the white candidates. Id. at 444. Although this system of promotion obviously
favored blacks over whites, and had in fact resulted in more blacks than whites being promoted to
supervisory positions, the Court held that it was no defense to the disparate impact claim made
against the agency. Id. at 442.
"In considering claims of disparate impact under § [2000e-2(a)]," said Justice Brennan, "this
Court has never read § [2000e-2(a)] as requiring the focus to be placed instead on the overall
number of minority or female applicants actuall' hired or promoted." Id. at 450. Instead, he
continued, in disparate impact cases, "Title VII guarantees ...these individual[s] .. .the op-
portunity to compete equally with white workers on the basis of job-related criteria." Id. at 451.
The agency's bottom line showing that it had favored blacks over whites for promotions failed
because this practice only favored the plaintiffs' minority group as a whole and not the individual
plaintiffs themselves. Id. at 453-54. The rejection of individual in favor of group rights is, how-
ever, the essence of Griggs and Weber.
The result of Teal is to force employers either to abandon tests altogether or to rely on expen-
sive job-related testing procedures, which may be found invalid if challenged. Id. at 463 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
46. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
47. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
48. Id. at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1974)).
49. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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uisite amount of strength thought essential to good job perform-
ance." 50 Who could have imagined in 1964 that a civil rights statute
would preclude prison authorities from assuming that physically im-
posing prison guards would be particularly useful?
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer 51 illustrates perhaps
even more clearly than Dothard the potential of the disparate im-
pact theory of discrimination to produce results most people would
regard as ludicrous. The New York Transit Authority ("TA") had
a rule-for which subway passengers presumably were grate-
ful-prohibiting employee use of narcotic drugs. Methadone is a
narcotic drug that when injected into the bloodstream with a needle
has essentially the same effects as heroin. Because a disproportion-
ate number of blacks and Hispanics are methadone users, the
Transit Authority's requirement was attacked by disqualified black
and Hispanic applicants under the disparate impact theory as con-
stituting racial discrimination in violation of both the Constitution
and Title VI1. A federal district judge in New York upheld the
claim.52 Perhaps it is important that subway conductors-the actual
drivers of trains-not be on methadone, he reasoned, but surely
there are many transit authority jobs-indeed, seventy-five percent
of the jobs, he found-that drug users can be expected adequately
to perform. 53 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed without reaching the Title VII claim. 5 4
A divided Supreme Court reversed, holding on the Title VII claim
that the plaintiff's prima facie case of racial discrimination was "as-
suredly rebutted by TA's demonstration that its narcotics rule (and
the rule's application to methadone users) is 'job-related.' 55 It is
enough, the Court said, that the TA's "legitimate employment goals
of safety and efficiency" are "significantly served by-even if they
50. Id. at 331.
51. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
52. Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp. 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), modified
in part and rev'd in part. 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). The same
plaintiffs had earlier successfully argued, before the same district judge, that this Transit Author-
ity rule violated their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1058 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), modified in part and revd in part, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
The plaintiffs then sued under Title VII in order to obtain an award of attorney's fees, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (1988). Beazer, 414 F. Supp. at 278.
53. Beazer. 399 F. Supp. at 1052.
54. Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1977), rev d, 440
U.S. 568 (1979).
55. Beazer. 440 U.S. at 587.
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do not require-TA's rule as it applies to all methadone users in-
cluding those who are seeking employment in non-safety-sensitive
positions.""6
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,57 a unanimous Court
held that the disparate impact theory of discrimination is applicable
even to the use of subjective or discretionary employment criteria. A
four-Justice plurality mitigated this expansion of Title VIi's cover-
age, however, by stating the elements of a disparate impact case in
an apparently restrictive manner. The plurality opinion by Justice
O'Connor made clear for the first time, for example, that although
the employer has the burden of producing evidence of "business ne-
cessity" in response to a plaintiff's prima facie case of "discrimina-
tion" on the basis of disparate impact, the burden of proof of a Title
VII violation remains with plaintiff.58
On the crucial issue of the meaning of "business necessity," the
plurality indicated in passing that an employer met its burden by
"producing evidence that its employment practices are based on le-
gitimate business reasons." 59 Citing lower court opinions, the plural-
ity indicated that deference should be given to employer judgment
and that the use of "plainly relevant criteria" should not be disal-
lowed just because they lead to "decisions which are difficult for a
court to review, ' 6° which amounts to saying that they need not be
specifically shown to be job-related. The plurality relied on Beazer
for the proposition that employment criteria are sufficiently justified
56. Id. at 587 n.31. Justice White dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall and partly
by Justice Brennan, arguing that the TA had not even come close to showing that the rule is
"'demonstrably a reasonable measure of job-performance,'" id. at 602 (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)), because the TA had adopted the
rule with no "meaningful study of [its] relationship to job-performance ability," id. (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431). The TA failed to show, Justice White argued, that
"the rule results in a higher quality labor force, that such a labor force is necessary, or that the
cost of making individual decisions about those on methadone was prohibitive." Id. (White, J.,
dissenting). This incredible position-how can an employer show, for example, that a higher qual-
ity labor force is "necessary"?-no doubt accounts for a provision in the 1991 Act that explicitly
exempts an employer from having to show that a requirement that excludes current users of illegal
drugs is a "business necessity." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.,L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105
Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(3) (1988 & Supp. II! 1991)). The provision
at the same time may effectively overrule Beazer, however, by providing that the exemption does
not apply to rules that exclude persons, like the plaintiffs in Beazer, who use narcotics pursuant to
supervised programs. Id.
57. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
58. Id. at 997.
59. Id. at 998.
60. Id. at 999 (quoting Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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if they are shown to "significantly serve[] . . . legitimate employ-
ment goals."61 Standards of proof should be set, the plurality said,
so as "to avoid giving employers incentives to modify any normal
and legitiMate practices by introducing quotas or preferential treat-
ment," 2 which the 1964 Act explicitly prohibits.6 3
The Court's next disparate impact case, Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio,6 4 was the precipitating cause of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 ("1991 Act"). Reversing a Ninth Circuit decision, the Court
held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie dispa-
rate impact case because they failed to compare the racial makeup
of the work force in the jobs in question with the racial makeup of a
relevant labor pool.65 In order to provide guidance to the court of
appeals on remand, the Court went on to discuss other aspects of a
disparate impact case. In essence, the Court affirmed and raised to
the status of a majority opinion the views expressed in Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Watson.
First, the Court affirmed that a plaintiff must identify "the spe-
cific employment practice that is challenged" and show that it "has
created the disparate impact under attack."66 Second, the Court re-
iterated that an employer could rebut a prima facie case by showing
that "a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legiti-
mate employment goals of the employer."67 "The touchstone of this
inquiry," the Court said, "is a reasoned review of the employer's
justification for his use of the challenged practice."6 8 While a "mere
insubstantial justification . . . will not suffice," neither must the
practice be shown to be " 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the em-
61. Id. at 998 (quoting Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31
(1979)).
62. Id. at 999.
63. Title ViI provides that it shall not be "interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant
preferential treatment to any individual or to any group" on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(j) (1988).
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, agreed
that the disparate impact theory should apply even to subjective employment criteria, but did not
share the plurality's concern about avoiding racially preferential hiring, and protested its apparent
tightening of the requirements for recovery. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
64. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
65. Id. at 650-51.
66. Id. at 656-57.




ployer's business. "" Finally, the Court reiterated that while the em-
ployer has the burden of providing evidence of business justification
for challenged practices if the plaintiff has made a prima facie case,
the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of discrimination still re-
mains, despite contrary indications in pre-Watson cases, on the
plaintiff.7"
An outraged dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Jug-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, disputed the majority on
all three points. Justice Stevens charged the majority with a "so-
journ into judicial activism," 71 which had become the favorite accu-
sation of the four judicial activists-they apparently considered it
effective strategy to attack as "activism" any attempt to limit the
results of their own genuine activism. The dissent insisted, first, that
business justification for employment practices with a disparate im-
pact is an affirmative defense to a Title VII action and, therefore,
that the burden of proof on liability shifts to the defendant after the
plaintiff has made a prima facie case by showing that the practice
has caused a racial imbalance.72
The position of the dissenting Justices, however, requires a rewrit-
ing of Title VII. The offense under Title VII is racial discrimina-
tion, not racial imbalance. Griggs holds that prohibited discrimina-
tion may be found on the basis of a showing of unjustified use of
employment practices with a disproportionate racial effect, but dis-
crimination must remain the ultimate issue if it is Title VII that is
being enforced. The burden must be on the plaintiff, therefore, to
show that the challenged practices are unjustified and therefore,
under Griggs, discriminatory. If the statute prohibits discrimination,
plaintiff must show discrimination; if discrimination can be demon-
strated by showing unjustified disparate impact, plaintiff must show
that. A defendant's failure to produce evidence of business justifica-
tion does not remove a plaintiff's burden of showing lack of justifica-
tion; it merely makes it easier for a factfinder to hold that the bur-
den has been met. The difference between a law that prohibits racial
discrimination, which can be found on the basis of practices with
unjustified disparate impact, and a law that prohibits racial imbal-
ance unless the practices that cause it can be justified may be a
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 668-79 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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subtle one, but it is the difference between placing the burden of
showing justification on the plaintiff and placing it on the defendant.
It is the difference between Title VII as written and the statute the
dissenters would prefer.
Making racial imbalance instead of racial discrimination the ba-
sic offense-the result of making justification of disparate impact
employment criteria an affirmative defense-inevitably leads to the
conclusion that justification should be difficult. If racial imbalance is
the offense, it should be tolerated only if unavoidable; if racial dis-
crimination is the offense, it should be found on the basis of nonra-
cial employment criteria only if they serve no significant business
need. Justice Stevens therefore concluded, predictably, that the em-
ployer's burden of proof on the issue of justification is "weighty. 73
He declared himself "astonished" at the Court's statement that
there should be a "reasoned review of the employer's justification"
and that the challenged practice need not be shown to be "essen-
tial."174 In Dothard v. Rawlinson,'7 he stated, the Court held that
the challenged height and weight requirements had to be shown to
be "essential to good job performance." '76 The Court's actual hold-
ing in Dothard, however, was only that the requirements had to be
shown to be correlated with "the requisite amount of strength
thought essential to good job performance. ' 77 More serious, Justice
Stevens simply ignored his own statement for the Court in Beazer,
primarily relied on by the majority, that it is enough that "legiti-
mate employment goals" are "significantly served" by the chal-
lenged practices.
Finally, Justice Stevens denounced as excessively onerous the
Court's requirement that plaintiffs in disparate impact cases specify
the employment practice that allegedly caused the disparate impact.
"[P]roof of numerous questionable employment practices," he ar-
gued, "ought to fortify an employee's assertion that the practices
caused racial disparities. 78 This seems to mean that if a plaintiff
complains of enough practices, it will not be necessary for him to
specify the nature of his complaint, in terms of effect, as to any.
Justice Stevens did not appear eager to state his position with clar-
73. Id. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
.76. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 671 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331.
78. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ity, but he apparently would permit Title VII litigation to begin
with a showing of little more than the existence of "racial dispari-
ties" in an employer's work force. The majority's approach, he
charged, violates "principles of fairness" by "tipping the scales in
favor of employers."' 79 His approach, however, converts Title VII
from a prohibition of racial discrimination into a prohibition of ra-
cial work-force imbalance unless the employer can show it to be vir-
tually unavoidable.
IV. THE ELUSIVE MEANING OF "BUSINESS NECESSITY"
IN THE 1991 ACT
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress found that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Wards Cove "weakened the scope and ef-
fectiveness of Federal civil rights protections. ' 0 The 1991 Act ex-
plicitly adopts, for the first time, the disparate impact theory of a
Title VII violation81 and, explicitly overruling Wards Cove on the
issue, places on defendant employers the burden of justifying chal-
lenged practices shown to have a disparate impact.82 On the other
hand, it affirms Wards Cove, and rejects the dissent's position, by
providing that the plaintiff ordinarily must identify the particular
practice alleged to have a disparate impact.83 On the crucial issue of
the weight of the burden of justification, however, the Act is much
less clear.
The Act states that the employer's burden is "to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity."8 4 It further states that one of its
purposes is "to codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job
related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
79. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.
81. Id. § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (1988 &
Supp. I1 1991)).
82. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) to (C) (1988 & Supp. Il1 1991)).
83. Id. The 1991 Act provides:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under
this title only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employ-
ment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race . . . and the respon-
dent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity ...."




Co. . . . and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio."85 The Act does not, however, define
the codified concepts other than by this reference to Supreme Court
decisions. Indeed, it provides, probably uniquely, that the crucial
term "business necessity" is to be understood as if it had no legisla-
tive history, despite the fact that its meaning was intensely debated
by Congress over a period of two years. Only an "interpretive mem-
orandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991)," the Act states, "shall be considered legis-
lative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in
construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to
Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business
practice."86 The uniquely authoritative interpretative memorandum
referred to, unfortunately, merely repeats, almost verbatim, -what is
stated in the 1991 Act itself, that the "terms 'business necessity'
and 'job related' are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. . . . and in the
other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio."81
The crucial question, therefore, is: What is the "concept" of "bus-
iness necessity" enunciated in Griggs and the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove? How, if at all, was the concept
changed in Wards Cove? In Griggs, after stating that "[t]he touch-
stone is business necessity," 88 the Court stated, more specifically,
that the employer's burden is to show that the challenged employ-
ment standard has "a manifest relationship to the employment in
question." ' This phrase was repeated and apparently treated as the
definitive statement of the relevant test in every later case, including
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Watson and both the major-
ity and dissenting opinions in Wards Cove itself. This makes it ex-
tremely difficult, to say the least, to state what precisely is the dif-
ference, if any, in the meaning of "business necessity" between
Wards Cove and prior cases.
85. Id. § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (citations omitted) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 &
Supp. 111 1991)).
86. Id. § '105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. III
1991)).
87. 137 CONG. REC. S12,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (sponsors' interpretive memorandum)
(citations omitted).
88. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
89. Id. at 432.
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On the business necessity issue, Wards Cove, as alreaidy noted, is
essentially a reaffirmation of Watson. Is Watson not to be consid-
ered a Supreme Court decision prior to Wards Cove, on the ground
that it is only a plurality opinion? We are, of course, explicitly pre-
cluded from seeking light from legislative history. Unless Watson is
excluded from consideration, however, Wards Cove clearly made no
significant change in the prior law. The result would be that the
1991 Act's codification of "business necessity" is entirely without
effect in regard to Wards Cove.
It is arguable that Wards Cove made no change in the concept of
"business necessity" even if Watson is not considered. Indeed, that
is precisely what the Bush Administration's congressional supporters
claim is the compromise they agreed to and on the basis of which
they withdrew their opposition to the 1991 Act °0 On the issue of
"business necessity," Watson relied primarily on Beazer, the most
recent prior case, and Wards Cove also relied on Beazer as well as
on Watson. The crucial Wards Cove statements are that the "busi-
ness necessity" or "job related" issue is "whether a challenged prac-
tice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of
the employer," and that the challenged practice need not be "essen-
tial" or "indispensable" to the employer's business. 1 These state-
ments, however, simply paraphrase the Beazer statement that it is
enough for an employer to show that its "legitimate employment
goals" are "significantly served by-even if they do not re-
quire"-the challenged practice.92 The claim of the Bush Adminis-
tration and its supporters that the 1991 Act as finally agreed to was
not intended to make any change in the "business necessity" con-
cept is further supported by the fact that an earlier version explicitly
spoke of overruling Wards Cove, while the Act that escaped the
President's veto speaks only of codifying the law prior to Wards
Cove.9"
In sum, the meaning of "business necessity'.' in the 1991 Act can-
90. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,472-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Section-by-Section Analysis
Representing the Views of the Administration and Senator Burns, Cochran, Dole, Garn, Gorton,
Grassley, Hatch, Mack, McCain, McConnell, Murkowski, Simpson, Seymour and Thurmond).
The Administration's analysis notes that "the present bill has codified the 'business necessity' test
employed in Beazer and reiterated in Wards Cove. The language in the bill is thus plainly not
intended to make that test more onerous for employers to satisfy than it had been under current
law." Id. at S15,476.
91. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
92. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979).
93. See supra note 90.
19921 1135
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
not be determined by looking at the Act, and the Act tells us we
may look nowhere else except to the Supreme Court decisions prior
to Wards Cove. The majority in Wards Cove, however, claimed that
their decision in that case made no change in the prior law as they
understood it. It seems entirely possible, therefore, that the majority
may continue to develop and apply the "business necessity" lan-
guage of Griggs as if the 1991 Act had not intervened.
That, at least, is what one would argue as an advocate for an
employer-that the long struggle to change the definition of "busi-
ness necessity" ended in a stalemate. Countering this is the fact that
the 1991 Act was a victory for the liberals in Congress in several
respects, including its stated purpose to correct the "weakened" civil
rights enforcement that supposedly resulted from Ward's Cove.
Courts should interpret legislation neither narrowly, if that means to
cut it back, nor broadly, if that means to expand it, but simply in
the utmost good faith to effectuate legislative intent to the extent it
can be ascertained. The history of "civil rights" law over the past
four decades is a history of liberals winning in the courts victories
they could not win in the political process, which is a perversion of
our constitutional system of government. This time the liberals ap-
pear to have won in the political process, and it would be no less a
perversion of our system of government-even though only statutory
interpretation is involved, and limiting the 1991 Act would surely
serve the public interest-for conservatives to attempt to take that
victory away from them in the courts.
The question, however, is the extent of the liberals' victory; it
would be just as improper for courts to give them more than they
won than to give them less. Indeed, in a country based on individual
liberty-or a country that would pursue prosperity-there should be
a presumption against the expansion of law, coercion, and liability.
If, therefore, a court acting in total good.faith can make no reasona-
ble determination that a law expands liability beyond a certain
point, it should assume that it does not.
The liberals won many victories in the 1991 Act. They won offi-
cial recognition of the disparate impact theory of discrimination,
which effectively converts Title VII of the 1964 Act from a prohibi-
tion of racial discrimination into a requirement of racial prefer-
ences. They had the burden of proof of business necessity placed on
the employer, which greatly strengthens the requirement of racial
preferences by making the basic offense not discrimination but a
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lack of work-force racial "balance." They achieved many other liti-
gation-encouraging gains that make the 1991 Act a bonanza for
plaintiffs and their lawyers." ' For at least three reasons, however,
the scope of their victory, if any, on the business necessity issue is
difficult or impossible to determine.
First, although it is clear that the liberals wanted to undo Wards
Cove, which was seen as weakening the "business necessity" re-
quirement, the concessions they were forced to make in order to
avoid a presidential veto may well have amounted, as noted above,
to their achieving nothing on this crucial issue. 5
Second, the Act presents courts with the difficult, but unfortu-
nately not unprecedented, question of how to deal with legislation
that is largely hypocritical or simply dishonest because it cannot
openly state, but must conceal, the actual objective of its sponsors. 9
The liberals' dilemma is and was that although they favor, or at
least have no serious objection to, racial preferences and quo-
tas-believing that the time has come to move beyond equality of
opportunity to equality of results, and from individual rights to
group rights-they are politically unable to state this openly. In-
deed, they are compelled to declare their opposition to racial prefer-
ences. Courts should of course implement legislation according
towhat it actually (and knowingly) says, even though it is known
that sponsoring legislators hoped to achieve the opposite of what
they were politically required to say. Courts, that is, should not co-
operate in the perpetuation of a ruse.
The result is that the 1991 Act is a statute at war with itself. On
the one hand, by placing the burden of proof of business necessity
94. For example, potential liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is greatly expanded, see Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1981(b), (c) (1988 & Supp. 111 1991)); damages are no longer limited to discrimination on the
basis of race, see id. § 102 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1988 & Supp. Iii 1991)); and provi-
sion is made for the payment of fees to experts, see id. § 113 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(c),
2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. II1 1991)).
95. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,474-76 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (listing the many restrictive
definitions of "business necessity"-for example, "essential to effective job perform-
ance"-suggested by proponents of the Act but not accepted).
96. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 to 13b, 21a (1988), is another example. It was
a Depression-era measure enacted to protect small businessmen from competition (primarily small
retail and wholesale grocers from the A & P chain) at the expense of consumers, but it was
necessarily drafted as an antitrust measure, as if meant to foster competition and protect consum-
ers. Since it could only be passed as an antitrust statute, the courts should certainly interpret it as
such, even though the result is clearly the opposite of what its sponsors intended. See MARTIN J.
ADELMAN. A & P-A STUDY IN PRICE-COsT BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC-POLICY (1959).
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on employers and making the burden heavier-to the extent that it
does-the Act requires employers to discriminate racially in making
employment decisions. On the other hand, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which the 1991 Act does not repeal but merely amends, still
purports to prohibit racial discrimination and still contains. a provi-
sion (redundant in light of the prohibition) explicitly rejecting racial
preferences. Most important, the 1991 Act adds a provision-which
the Act's proponents could not oppose without exposing their attach-
ment to quotas-prohibiting "race norming," that.'is, the manipula-
tion of test scores in order to make blacks appear more competitive
with whites." This is the only provision of the Act that can properly
be described as a "civil rights" measure, a measure that, if enforced,
will actually make a contribution to preventing discrimination
against individuals on the basis of race. Indeed, if properly imple-
mented, the prohibition of race norming could mean the end of "af-
firmative action"-discrimination in favor of blacks and against
whites-in a vast array of employment contexts.
If hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays to virtue, it is right to insist
that payment be made. If vice-in this case, the favoring of racial
preferences-cannot be suppressed, it should at least be made to
hide its face. The 1964 Act's continuing condemnation of racial dis-
crimination and the 1991 Act's (therefore redundant) condemnation
of race norming should therefore be taken seriously, as if prohibit-
ing, not requiring, racial discrimination continues to be the congres-
sional objective in fact as well as in name. If the liberals in Congress
want something as politically unpalatable as racial preferences, they
should be required to say so openly and clearly so that the public
may understand what is happening; they should not be allowed to
have the racial preferences they want while claiming to abjure
97. Section 106, "Prohibition Against Discriminatory Use of Test Scores," provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with
the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, to
adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of,
employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 106, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e-2(l) (1988 & Supp. I1 1991)).
The Sponsors' Interpretive Memorandum, supra note 87, 137 CONG. REC. at S12,276, states
that the purpose of the section is "to bar the practice of 'race norming' and other practices used to
alter or adjust the scores of job applicants on employment-related tests." Under race norming,
blacks compete only with blacks and whites only with whites, with the result that a black can
achieve a test score much lower than that of a white and yet be reported to an employer as being




There is no escaping, nonetheless, that the purpose and effect of
the 1991 Act is to require employers to discriminate racially to the
extent that it is easier for them to do so than to undertake to estab-
lish the business necessity of challenged employment criteria. The
1991 Act is, therefore, inconsistent with the 1964 Act it amends,
but so was Griggs. Perhaps the real significance of the 1991 Act is
that the Griggs disparate impact theory is no longer the illegitimate
product of Supreme Court misbehavior but a part of statutory law.
That theory means that employers are required to incur additional
costs and some individuals must be advantaged and others disadvan-
taged because of race-less-qualified black employees must be pre-
ferred to more-qualified whites-in order to achieve a more racially
integrated workforce.
The third reason that the scope of the liberals' victory on the bus-
iness necessity issue is limited or at least uncertain is that Congress
did not state how loss in efficiency and gain in racial integration are
to be balanced. It probably is not possible to formulate an adminis-
trable rule indicating how much cost, in absolute or relative terms,
must be incurred for a given gain, in absolute or relative terms, in
racial integration. In any event, Congress is unwilling (politically
unable) openly to admit that a cost must be incurred, that is, that
racial preferences are required. The result, as with any illogical
command, is to leave virtually unlimited discretion-the real law-
making power-in the hands of courts and administrative agencies.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the best that conscientious judges can do in this situation
is to continue to impose efficiency losses on employers in the interest
of increased work force racial balance more or less as they have
done ever since the Supreme Court's wrongful and misguided deci-
sion in Griggs. Unlike the Supreme Court in Griggs, however, they
should state openly that this is exactly what they are doing and feel
required to do under the 1991 Act. Honesty is almost always a vir-
tue in the administration of the law. Here, it might have the effect
of requiring Congress to take a consistent and comprehensible posi-
tion on the issue of racial preferences in employment. In any event,
it should serve to enlighten the public as to exactly what is going on.
For many years the Court, led by Justice Brennan, was far to the
left of Congress, consistently handing down socially destructive deci-
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sions such as Swann, Griggs, Weber, and Bakke in defiance of statu-
tory law as well as the public will. Justice Brennan (after a third of
a century) and Justice Marshall (after a quarter of a century) are
finally gone, and the Court is attempting to limit, as in Wards Cove,
the reach of some of its worst mistakes. The saddest lesson of the
misnamed Civil Rights Act of 1991 is that Congress, now to the left
of the Court, will not permit that to happen.
